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Reconsidering State Parole Board Membership
Requirements in Light of Model Penal Code
Sentencing Revisions
Stefan J. Bing,
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Marie Ragghianti, then serving as chair of Tennessee's Board of
Probation and Parole, blew the whistle on wide-scale corruption involving
then Governor Ray Blanton.' Before she was fired, Ragghianti exposed a
"cash for clemency" scheme propagated by Blanton's administration to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In this scheme, inmates with ties to
the Governor or his political allies paid to be released from prison and the
Governor pardoned them in exchange.3 Governor Blanton's legal counsel,
Eddie Sisk, pressured Parole Board members to violate their release
guidelines in order to "recommend" these inmates for pardon.4 Ragghianti
became suspicious when Sisk continued to pursue the release of an inmate
convicted of double homicide.' She began collecting evidence about the
corruption while the state mounted a campaign to discredit her, including
two alleged setups for DUI arrests.6 Ultimately, Ragghianti resigned and
became a political pariah, Sisk and another participant were convicted,
Blanton did not seek reelection (and later was convicted for his participation
in selling liquor licenses), and Ragghianti's story became the subject of a
successful motion picture.7
I Juris Doctor, 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA, 2005, Case Western
Reserve University. The author wishes to thank the editors and staff of the Kentucky Law
Journal, whose dedication to producing a flawless publication is apparent and appreciated. All
remaining errors are my own.
2 See HANK HILLIN, FBI CODENAME TENNPAR: TENNESSEE'S RAY BLANTON YEARS 58-60,
73-80 (David Fox ed., 1985). Seegenerally PETER MAAS, MARIE: A ThUE STORY (1983) (providing
biographical information and further detail of Ragghianti's account).
3 See April Hejka-Ekins, Marie Ragghianti: Moral Courage in Exposing Corruption, in
EXEMPLARY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: CHARACTER AND LEADERSHIP IN GOVERNMENT 304, 307-
i6 (Terry L. Cooper & N. Dale Wright eds., ist ed. 1992); HILLIN, supra note 2, at 58-59,
74-76.
4 Hejka-Ekins, supra note 3, at 307-08.
5 Id. at 308.
6 Id. at 3IO--14.
7 See id. at 315-17; MAAS, supra note 2, at 414-15; see also Marie, IMDb, http://www.imdb.
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Perhaps the most infamous incident of corruption within state parole
boards, Marie Ragghianti's story, albeit an extreme example, represents
many of the problems facing the criminal justice system today in the area
of parole board decision making. Parole boards in many states function as
the final step in the sentencing phase; they have the final word on the
length of the prison sentence. The discretion that parole board members
exercise has important implications for the system and society in general
and "affects public safety by selecting for release those inmates predicted
to discontinue criminal behavior."' Parole boards apportion resources
by controlling prison populations, "influenc[ing] prison officials' ability
to control inmate populations because boards consider prison behavior
in deciding whether to release the inmates," and "influenc[ing] the
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system."9 The legitimacy of the
criminal justice system is bolstered when "victims, offenders, and the
general public" regard state parole board decisions as "fair and rational."'"
Society must be satisfied that members of the parole board are qualified
to perform their discretionary function, maintain a level of impartiality to
political whims and corruption, and make decisions that are "proportionate,
equitable, uniform, [and] predictable.""
Currently, all fifty states have parole boards in some fashion."2 However,
sixteen states have cancelled the release authority of their boards.'3
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
199414 which, inter alia, provides funding for additional state prisons for
states that meet certain criteria." One of these criterion, called "truth-
in-sentencing,"' 6 requires that States enact laws that require persons
convicted of violent crimes "to serve not less than 85 percent" of the prison
com/title/ttoo89555/ (last visited Feb. z6, 2012) (detailing that the MGM film, released on
September 27, 1985, was directed by Roger Donaldson and starred Sissy Spacek as Ragghianti
and Jeff Daniels as Sisk).
8 Victoria J. Palacios, Go andSin No More: Rationality andRelease Decisions by Parole Boards,
45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 568 (1994).
9 Id.
io Id.
i I d. at 572.
12 See generally Interstate Compact Office Directory, INTERSTATE COMM'N FOR ADULT
OFFENDER SUPERVISION, 1-29 (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/o/
Library/contacts.pdf; see also Probation and Parole Directory, AM. PROB. & PAROLE Ass'N, http://
www.appa-net.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Webcode.VB-Directory (last visited Mar. 12,
2012).
13 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.1o cmt. b (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2009).
14 Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, !o8 Stat. 1796
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, I6, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
15 Seeid. §§ 20101-09,108 Stat. at 1815-19 (current version at42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-13708
(2006)).
16 § 13704.
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sentence.17 One effect of the "truth-in-sentencing" requirement has
been the diminution of the importance of parole boards in certain states.
Eight states abolished parole board release during the same year a truth-
in-sentencing law was passed. 8 Nevertheless, these states retain their
parole boards to make decisions regarding persons sentenced "prior to the
effective date of the law that eliminated parole board release."19 Moreover,
in addition to establishing the date of release, parole boards supervise
felons after their release from incarceration.""0
Most states provide certain statutory requirements for parole board
membership. Many state statutes provide relatively narrow requirements
for board members. For instance, in South Dakota, the board is required
to have three attorneys . 2 New York law requires that each member of its
parole board have at least a bachelor's degree and five years work experience
in the fields of "criminology, administration of criminal justice, law
enforcement, sociology, law, social work, corrections, psychology, psychiatry
or medicine.""2 However, most states do not have strict requirements, 3
resulting in underqualified board appointees.
2 4
Provisions for judicial immunity and deficient release guidelines
both illustrate parole board members' lack of accountability. First, much
like judges and executive officials making discretionary decisions, state
parole board members are generally given absolute judicial immunity
against damages suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Thus, despite
the distinct due process implications of parole board hearings-especially
parole revocation hearings-board members' decisions are insulated from
liability. Second, parole release guidelines in states that have maintained
their boards' release authority are inconsistent and often do not provide
sufficient criteria to ensure accountability for release decisions.2 6
17 § 13704(a)(i);seealso PAULA M. DITrON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUB. No. NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS
3 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=820.
i8 DITTON & WILSON, supra note 17, at 3 (Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Mississippi, Ohio,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
19 Id.
20 See Palacios, supra note 8, at 574.
21 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-13-I (Supp. 2003).
22 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-b(2) (McKinney 2010).
23 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075 (West 2011) (Board members "shall reflect as nearly
as possible a cross section of the racial, sexual, economic, and geographic features of the popu-
lation of the state."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.665 (2004) ("[Mlembers of the board shall be per-
sons of recognized integrity and honor.").
24 See Palacios, supra note 8, at 579.
25 See Julio A. Thompson, Note, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial
Immunity to Parole BoardMembers in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICti. L. REV. 241, 244-45
(1988).
26 See Part I.A, infra.
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Currently, the American Law Institute is drafting new sentencing
provisions for its Model Penal Code, much of which addresses the parole
process in the United States. This ambitious new draft addresses three
important issues that directly relate to the state of parole boards across
the country. First, the new Model Penal Code, recognizing the failure
of the current parole structure as well as recent trends in many states
and the federal system, recommends a movement toward determinate
sentencing that will essentially eliminate the release authority of state
parole boards.2 7 Second, the new draft of the Model Penal Code addresses
the need to provide thorough, uniform sentencing guidelines that reflect
the emerging field of evidence-based sentencing. 8 Evidence-based
sentencing, colloquially referred to as "best available research," recognizes
the importance of quantitative research and data analysis to assess "the
needs of offenders that must be met to facilitate their rehabilitation, and
to assist the courts in judging the amenability of individual offenders to
specific rehabilitative programs in confinement or in the community."2 9
Third, the ALT has proposed to add a new provision to the Code to address
the modification of long-term prison sentences by affording an "official
decision maker" the authority to take a "second look" at prisoners who
have served more than fifteen years.30 The statute and comments purposely
avoid making a determination as to who should have the authority to take
this "second look" at sentences. It identifies three options: newly created
agencies or tribunals, parole boards, and trial courts.
This Note will make sense of the impact that evidence-based
sentencing, reflected in the new draft of the Model Penal Code, may
have on the parole process in the United States. Part I of this Note will
examine the current state of parole boards across the country, including the
appointment and removal process, the requirements for board membership,
the current makeup of board membership, the inconsistent and often
inadequate release guidelines afforded to parole boards that result in overly
broad discretion, and the lack of accountability of board members resulting
from absolute immunity from prosecution. Part II will outline the three key
proposals in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code sentencing
provisions and their potential effect on state parole boards.
Part III will address the changes that are necessary in order for parole
board membership to comport with the recent trend toward evidence-
based sentencing. As they are presently structured, parole boards are
woefully unprepared to embrace states' ambitions to adopt evidence-based
sentencing. Former law enforcement officials, wardens, and parole officers,
which currently constitute the majority of parole board membership
27 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.o9(i) (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2009).
28 See id.
29 Id.
30 Id. § 305.6(I) cmt. a.
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positions, generally lack the skills necessary to analyze quantitative data.
Moreover, attorneys, who also constitute a substantial portion of parole
board membership, generally do not understand statistical concepts3 and
often view s'tatistical data and research-based information as less helpful
than clinical opinion.3"
Finally, Part IV of the Note will recommend that states adopt a statutory
structure that requires a balance of law enforcement officials, attorneys, and
social scientists on state parole boards. Parole boards with this blend of
membership are the best-suited for providing a "second look" at long-
term sentences, supervising the rehabilitation of paroled inmates, and
understanding the new sentencing guidelines reflecting evidence-based
sentencing. If there is an accession that evidence-based sentencing will
be the wave of the future, the decision regarding who makes the decisions
becomes even more high stakes than ever before.
I. CURRENT STATE OF PAROLE BOARDS AND STRUCTURE OF THE LAw
A. Parole Board Structure and Inconsistent Guidelines
In most states, parole board members are nominated by the governor
and approved with the advice and consent of the state senate.33 Aside from
this common similarity, however, the state laws governing parole board
appointments beyond this shared thread are disparate. For example, the
number of members on state parole boards may range from three members3'
to nineteen.35 Most state statutes require that parole board members serve
in their capacity full-time.3 6 Additionally, parole board members serve
31 Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy
and Practice, I CHAPMAN J. OF CRIM. JUST. I, j6 n.79 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract= 1424008.
32 Richard E. Redding & Daniel C. Murrie, Judicial Decision MakingAbout Forensic Mental
Health Evidence, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING Topics AND EXPANDING ROLES 683, 685-
86 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 2007).
33 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-20 (LexisNexis 2011) ("shall be filled by appointment by
the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate"); ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.020 (2OIO);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-401, 38-211 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-201 (2oo6); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 5075 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (West 20o); GA. CODE ANN. §
42-9-2 (1997); 730 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-1(a) to (b) (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3707 (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.320(1) (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
27, § 4 (LexisNexis 2007); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-5(1) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
217.665(1) (West 2004); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6111 (b) (West 2010); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 508.031(a) (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.I-I34 (2009).
34 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.005(1) (2011) ("at least three but no more than five members").
35 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-b.1 (McKinney 2010) ("board shall consist of not more than
nineteen members").
36 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-20(g) (LexisNexis 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 42--9-5 (Supp.
2011).
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terms ranging from three to six years.37 The requirements for removing
parole board members also vary from state to state. Whereas one state may
allow removal only for cause, another state may offer very little protection
for parole board members and remind them that they serve at the pleasure
of the Governor.3" This threat of removal introduces a "political element"3 9
into the parole process. Parole board members seeking to serve another
term are likely to act in accordance with the goals of the administration
so they can ensure reappointment.40 Parole boards also face pressure
from sources beyond the political sphere. Members are "prone to bend to
community pressure in connection with decisions to award or deny parole
to notorious criminals.
41
Some states do not specify any particular requirements for parole
board membership.42 Other states use vague and expansive language
without mentioning any specific criteria 3.4 A few states provide only that
parole board members should reflect "a cross section of the racial, sexual,
economic, and geographic features of the population of the state."' Some
states, on the other hand, require parole board members to meet more
rigorous requirements for appointment such as extensive experience in
certain disciplines 45 or a Bachelor's degree. 46 In certain states, statutes
37 Thompson, supra note 25, at 252.
38 VA. CODE ANN. § 53. '-134 (2009).
39 See Thompson, supra note 25, at 253.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-2o(b) (LexisNexis 201 i) ("Any vacancy occurring on the
board.., shall be filled ... from a list of five qualified persons."); ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.02o(d)
(200) ("The governor shall make appointments to the board with due regard for representa-
tion on the board of the ethnic, racial, sexual, and cultural populations of the state.").
43 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.j6.03o(a) (Supp. 2010) ("The governor shall appoint mem-
bers who are able to consider the character and background of offenders and the circum-
stances under which offenses were committed."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-401 (Supp. 2011)
("Each member shall be appointed on the basis of broad educational qualifications and ex-
perience and shall have demonstrated an interest in the state's correctional program."); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 353-61 (Supp. 2007) ("Nominees to the authority shall be selected on the basis
of their qualifications to make decisions that will be compatible with the welfare of the com-
munity and of individual offenders, including their background and ability for appraisal of
offenders and the circumstances under which offenses were committed.").
44 CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075(b) (West 2011); see also ALASKA STAT. § 33.I6.02o(d) (zoo)
("The Governor shall make appointments to the board with due regard for representation on
the board of the ethnic, racial, sexual, and cultural populations of the state.").
45 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2007) ("The members of the Board
shall have had at least 5 years of actual experience in the fields of penology, corrections work,
law enforcement, sociology, law, education, social work, medicine, psychology, other behav-
ioral sciences, or a combination thereof.").
46 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 611 i(d) (West 2oo).
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provide that the board must consist of a person who has been the victim of
a crime.47
As a result of these disparate requirements, the makeup of parole boards
is extremely different from state to state. For example, in Kentucky, the
nine-member parole board has two attorneys, one retired teacher, and six
members with a background in criminal justice and corrections. 48 On the
other hand, each member of Utah's five-member parole board has received
a Juris Doctorate.49 Generally, most parole board members have served
in the corrections system as a corrections officer, warden, parole officer,
probation officer, or in another capacity.s0
B. Judicial Immunity for Parole Board Members
The United States Supreme Court has held that common law judges are
entitled to absolute immunity from § 19 8 3 " damages suits for performing
a "judicial act,"5" but this immunity does not insulate them from all
liability. For example, personnel decisions made by a judge may not be an
"adjudicative function" that enjoys the protection of absolute immunity.5 3
Procedural safeguards are in place within the judicial process that will
"prevent and correct most constitutional violations,"' 4 such as "insulation of
the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving
47 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-134 (2009) (requiring that one member of the Parole Board
be a member of crime victim's rights organization or an actual victim of crime).
48 See Board Members, Ky. JUST. & PUB. SAFETY CABINET, http://justice.ky.gov/parolebd/
members.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
49 See Board Members, ST. UTAH BD. PARDONS & PAROLE, http://bop.utah.govboard.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
50 See, e.g., Board Members, Ky. JUST. & PUB. SAFETY CABINET, http://justice.ky.gov/pa-
rolebd/members.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
5 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (entitling those who
have suffered a "deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution" caused by a state
official acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State" to a remedy for civil damages "except that in any action brought against a judicial of-
ficer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable"); seealso
Thompson, supra note 25, at 242.
52 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 362 (1978) (holding that a judge per-
formed a judicial act in ordering the sterilization of a young girl on the ex parte application of
her mother); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding that a judge was not liable for
an unconstitutional conviction); see also Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The
Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU
L. REV. 265, 273 (2oo6).
53 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) ("[I]mmuniy is justified and defined
by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.").
54 Johns, supra note 52, at 266.
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controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of
error on appeal." 5s
Absolute immunity has been extended to government officials, who are
subject to similar restraints and perform adjudicatory functions.56 However,
courts have been unwilling to grant absolute immunity to this class of
individuals, except in special circumstances. 7 Instead, courts generally
agree that qualified immunity "rather than absolute immunity is sufficient
to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties.""8 The Court
provides qualified immunity for damages from civil liability for government
officials serving a discretionary function "insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." 9 Qualified immunity has been
provided for many government officials including police officers 60 and
governors (and their aides),6' while absolute immunity is provided for the
President,6 prosecutors, 63 and state judges.64
The Supreme Court specifically reserved judgment on the question
of whether absolute or qualified immunity should apply to members of
state parole boards in Martinez v. California.6 However, the Tenth Circuit
held that parole board members are protected by absolute, quasi-judicial
immunity, at least for "actions taken in performance of the [bloard's official
duties regarding the granting or denying of parole." 66 The assumption is
that parole board members "so closely resemble judges that at least some
of their official conduct should be cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial
immunity, so that they too may be impartial decisionmakers. ' ' 67 For the
55 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
56 See id. at 515.
57 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n.4 (1993) (quoting Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (199'0).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 818 (1982) (providing qualified immunity for presi-
dential aides).
60 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
61 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
6z Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
63 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423, 427 (1976).
64 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54.
65 Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. i i (198o) ("We reserve the question of what
immunity, if any, a state parole officer has in a § 1983 action where a constitutional violation is
made out by the allegations.").
66 Russ v. Uppah, 972 F2d 300, 303 (ioth Cir. 1992) (quoting Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d
450,451 (ioth Cir. 1988)); seealso Giese v. Scafe, 133 F App'x 567, 569 (ioth Cir. 2005).
67 Thompson, supra note 25, at 246.
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most part, the First,6' Second,6 9 Fourth,70 Fifth, 71 Sixth,
72 Seventh,73
Eighth,74 Ninth,7" and Eleventh 76 Circuits have echoed the Tenth Circuit's
determination.
Some scholars argue that absolute, quasi-judicial immunity is an
inappropriate extension of the protection often given to judges and
executive officers. First, it "violates the common-law understanding in 1871
that parole decisions were protected by qualified, not absolute immunity. 77
Section 1983 was not in force in 1871 and parole decisions were made by
executive officials who enjoyed qualified immunity.7s Second, absolute
immunity is inappropriate because parole proceedings do not meet the
requirement that absolute judicial immunity is only permitted when there
are "procedural safeguards comparable to those of the judicial process.
79
Parole proceedings are characterized by "informality and brevity,"8 the
rules of evidence do not apply,8" and the decisions are only subject to very
minimal judicial review."
C. The Current State of Parole
States have made a number of changes to parole practices over the past
generation. Some states have made smaller changes such as relying on drug
testing, allowing parole officers to carry weapons, and requiring parolees
to wear electronic monitoring bracelets. 3 The most drastic example of
more sweeping changes is the wide-scale trend toward diminishing the
power of state parole boards to grant early release to prisoners. The ongoing
68 See Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 Fzd 5, 8 ('st Cir. 1987).
69 See Montero v. Travis, I71 E3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).
70 See Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400,405-06 (4th Cir. 1975).
71 See Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F3d 354,356 (5th Cir. 1995).
72 See Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App'x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005).
73 See Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F 3 d 1438, 445 (7th Cir. 1996).
74 See Anton v. Getty, 78 F3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1996).
75 See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F2d io64, io66 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Sellars v.
Procunier, 641 E2d 1295, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981).
76 See Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F2d 1 277, 12 78-79 (I ith Cir. 1990).
77 Johns, supra note 52, at 304.
78 See id.
79 Id.; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978).
8o See Christopher v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 589 F2d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding parole
board did not violate prisoner's due process rights by deny him cross-examination of adverse
witnesses).
81 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998).
82 Johns, supra note 52, at 307.
83 JEREMY TRAvis & SARAH LAWRENCE, Beyondthe Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America,
URB. INST. JUST. POL'Y CENTER, i-2 (Nov. 2002), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/310583-
beyond-prison__gates.pdf.
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battle over whether to adopt determinate or indeterminate sentencing
has also come to the foreground of the legal debate. In 1976, sixty-five
percent of prison releases were made by discretionary decisions as states
predominantly had indeterminate sentencing structures.84 By 1999, this
number dropped to twenty-four percent with the remaining releases
determined by law.85 The causes for this general shift are the subject of
much debate.
To date, sixteen states, the federal system, and the District of Columbia
have eliminated the parole-release authority of their parole boards.86
One study 7 shows that four states cancelled their parole boards' release
authorities in the 1970s, six jurisdictions did so in the 1980s (including one
that later changed its mind)88 and seven more took the step in the 1990s. In
1994, the American Bar Association endorsed this pattern, recommending
that "time served in prison should be determined by sentencing judges
subject to good-time reductions, all within a framework of sentencing
guidelines. '89 Nevertheless, two-thirds of U.S. sentencing systems have
retained paroling authority with substantial parole-release authority.9°
II. REVISED MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
The drafters of the new Model Penal Code provisions for sentencing are
currently undertaking an enormous project aimed at addressing fundamental
problems with the 1962 version. This Note addresses three key changes
that have an immense impact on parole board decision making. First, the
drafters of the Model Penal Code favor adopting a determinate sentencing
system, which removes the parole board's authority to fix prison-release
dates. This is certainly the most radical change in the new draft and one
that underlies almost every other change. Second, the drafters propose a
new article providing sentencing guidelines that acknowledge and suggest
the implementation of much of the evidence-based, quantitative, statistical
methods of risk assessment. Third, the drafters continue to consider
the concept of sentence modification for extremely long sentences. In
essence, this "second look" would provide an "official decision maker"
the opportunity to revisit sentences after the prisoner had served at least
fifteen years, a process that mirrors current parole board practices.
84 Id. at 4.
85 Id.
86 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING reporter's study at 3 (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2009).
87 Id. at 3 (citing JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 66-67 (2003)).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 3-4 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 30-3 1,
133-34, 16o (3d ed. 1994)).
90 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 86, at 4.
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A. Determinate Sentencing
In the current draft of the Model Penal Code's sentencing provisions,
the American Law Institute expressed its concern with the current state
of affairs of parole boards that possess parole-release authority. Due to
its view that parole boards are "the most disappointing of administrative
agencies," '91 the Institute has recommended removing the parole-release
authority from state parole boards, which sixteen states and the federal
system have already done.9 Implementation of a determinate system
reflects the Code's preference for "visible, regulated, and accountable
forums for the exercise of sentencing discretion." 93 It also reflects a policy
judgment that courts should determine the actual length of sentences at
the time of sentencing, "subject to only marginal adjustments based on
an inmate's behavior while institutionalized."' These new guidelines are
a drastic departure from parole boards' traditional discretionary release
function and bring into question whether they are becoming obsolete.
The Determinate Sentences of Imprisonment provision of the revision
exemplifies this movement away from indeterminate sentencing:
§ 6.10. Determinate Sentences of Imprisonment;
Postrelease Supervision
(1) Offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be released
after serving the prison term imposed by the sentencing court reduced
by credits for time served and good behavior as provided in §§ 7.09
and 305.1 [For offenses committed after the effective date of this
supervision, the authority of the parole board to grant parole release to
imprisoned offenders is abolished.]
(2) An offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment may be sentenced
to a separate term of postrelease supervision, to follow completion of the
prison term. The length of term of postrelease supervision independent
of the length of the prison term, served or unserved, and shall be
determined by the court at the time of sentencing under Article 305.
(3) Violations of conditions of postrelease supervision, and sanctions
upon violations, are determined as provided in Article 305.95
Although the revised section 6.10 seems to provide for the unilateral
elimination of parole boards, this is not entirely the case. First, as will
be addressed in Section C, the revised Code proposes a "second look"
provision, by which an "official decision maker" revisits long-term
sentences. Although that provision, in its most current version, does not
necessarily endorse parole boards as the gatekeeper of that function, it
does not foreclose the idea either. Second, the drafters acknowledge that
"[tihe elimination of a parole releasing authority in a jurisdiction bears
no relation to the question of whether a term of postrelease supervision
91 Id. at 2.
92 See supra Part I.C.
93 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 86, at 2.
94 Id.
95 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6. Io.
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is provided to released inmates."96 The Reporter's Note to section 6.10
favorably cites the fact that "nearly all states with determinate sentencing
structures retain and use widely a machinery for postrelease supervision."97
These mechanisms are commonly referred to as community supervision
or probation by the states.9" Most of these states retain parole boards that
"have the responsibility to set conditions of release for offenders under
conditional or supervised release, the authority to return an offender to
prison for violating the conditions of parole or supervised release, and the
power to grant parole for medical reasons." 99
The revised Code provisions do not directly address the role of
parole boards in supervised release. Rather, the Code suggests that the
current structure in place in states that have already adopted determinate
sentencing structures is satisfactory. The implication is that the drafters of
the revised Code are not in favor of total abandonment of parole boards,
despite their contempt for the ineffectiveness of the institution. Thus, if
parole boards are to remain intact, it is sensible that they undergo a major
overhaul that reflects the current Code provisions. An excellent first step
in this process is to provide more rigid requirements for board membership
that parallels the trend toward evidence-based sentencing guidelines.
B. Sentencing Guidelines
Another recommended change to the 1962 Code is the proposal for
uniform sentencing guidelines that acknowledges the potential benefits
of using statistical methodology to assess needs and risks inherent in the
process. The newly created section 6B.09 provides the framework:
§ 6B.09. Needs and Risk Assessments of Offenders
(1) The sentencing commission shall develop, and update as necessary,
instruments or processes, based on the best available research, to assess
the needs of offenders that must be met to facilitate their rehabilitation,
and to assist the courts in judging the amenability of individual offenders
to specific rehabilitative programs in confinement or in the community.
When these instruments or processes prove sufficiently reliable, the
commission may incorporate them into the sentencing guidelines.
(2) The commission shall develop, and update as necessary, offender
risk-assessment instruments or processes, supported by current and
ongoing recidivism research of felons in the state, that will estimate
the relative risks that individual felons pose to public safety through
future criminal conduct. When these instruments or processes prove
sufficiently reliable, the commission may incorporate them into the
sentencing guidelines.
96 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6. 1o reporter's note cmt. d (Discussion Draft No.
2, 2009).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 DITrON & WILSON, supra note 17, at 3; see also Palacios, supra note 8, at 574 ("Reformers
who insist that 'parole' be abolished frequently confuse determinate and indeterminate sen-
tencing" because "Itihe second aspect of parole is the continuing supervision of felons after
release from incarceration.").
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(3) The commission shall study the feasibility of identifying, through
risk-assessment instruments or processes, felony offenders who
present an unusually low risk to public safety, but who are subject to
a presumptive or mandatory sentence of imprisonment under the laws
or guidelines of the state. When accurate identifications of this kind are
reasonably feasible, for cases in which the offender is projected to be an
unusually low-risk offender, the sentencing court shall have discretion
to impose a community sanction rather than a prison term, or a prison
term of shorter duration,than indicated in statute or guidelines. The
sentencing guidelines shall provide that such exercises of discretion
by the sentencing court are not departures from the sentencing
guidelines.)0
The Reporter's Note following this proposed provision defines "risk
assessment" as "'predicting who will or will not behave criminally'
in the future"'01 and defines "needs assessment" as "using predictive
methods to attempt a reduction in criminality through assignment to
differential treatments."''0 Although the comments state that the provision
"incorporates statistical knowledge where it exists, and clinical judgments
where they can be most helpful,"'103 the Reporter's Note addresses
the notion that actuarial predictions of risk may be superior to clinical
predictions of risk. 1°4 For example, the Reporter cites a study that argues,
"in virtually every decision-making situation for which the issue has been
studied, it has been found that statistically developed predictive devices
outperform human judgment."' s Meanwhile, certain states have already
begun codifying needs and risk assessment via empirical research in their
statutes. 106
In addressing the flaws of the revised sentencing provisions, Judge
Michael H. Marcus maintained, "the revision will disappoint any who
expected a modern, empirical, or promising strategy for overcoming the
shortcomings of the current criminal justice system.""°' Principally, Marcus
is critical of the Code for recognizing the various purposes of sentencing,
such as "rehabilitation, deterrence, parsimony, incapacitation when
necessary to public safety, and proportionality,"' 18 without prioritization
100 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6B.o9.
101 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.o9 reporter's note cmt. a (Discussion Draft
No. 2, 2009) (quoting Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment.
Old Problems and New Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 192 (2oo6)).
102 Id.
103 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6. 1o cmt. b.
104 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note ioi, § 6B.o9 cmt. a.
105 Id. (quoting Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Accuracy of Prediction
Models, in CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS 247 (Albert Blumstein ed., 1986)).
1o6 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2 1-4729 (2011) (incorporating actuarial and clinical tools
into risk-needs statute for drug offenders to determine risk of recidivism as well as for the
selection of treatment interventions to be used in specific cases).
107 Michael H. Marcus, Responding to the Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions: Tips for
Early Adopters andPower Users, 17 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 67,67 (2007).
Io8 Id. at 68.
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of these purposes or a "strategy for their pursuit."' 1 9 Marcus recognizes
an "ideological stalemate" among those who favor incarceration as
rehabilitation and those who favor it as a means of public safety that has
produced "an unholy alliance against empiricism."' He recommends a
code that would "focus sentencing primarily on crime reduction within
limits of proportionality and priority, throughout the range of available
sentencing dispositions, and with due regard for available resources." '' To
achieve this goal, it is recommended that states adopt specific provisions
that allow for evidence-based sentencing"' Marcus's recommendations
go further than the proposed "best evidence available" language of the
revised Code to suggest "best available evidence, research, and data."1 3
Despite these concerns, from the language of the sentencing guidelines
statute, the accompanying commentary, and recent breakthroughs among
states codifying actuarial assessment strategies, commentators can infer that
the revised Code will increase the importance of empirical data analysis in
sentencing decisions.This movement toward statistical assessment suggests
that states echo this trend in membership requirements for parole boards.
Without social scientists, statisticians, or other persons trained with actuarial
expertise, the adoption of the revised Code would be fruitless. Parole
boards given the responsibility of overseeing post-release supervision must
understand the fundamentals of how sentencing decisions are made. The
current structure of parole boards, dominated by former law enforcement
officials and, to a lesser degree, attorneys, is contrary to the statistical analysis
of the purpose of risk-needs assessment. There is evidence suggesting that
"lawyers typically have little or no training in science, and few understand
basic statistical concepts."'1 4 Investing resources in adopting the revised
Code without any accompanying changes to parole board membership
requirements is analogous to buying an expensive jet without anyone to
pilot it.
C. "Second Look" Long-Term Sentence Modification
Although the revised Model Penal Code recommends eliminating the
parole-release authority of state parole boards, it proposes to accomplish
this drastic undertaking by retaining modification of long-term prison
sentences. Unlike other provisions in the revised Code, the American
Law Institute "does not recommend a specific legislative mechanism for
o9 Id.
iio Id. at 70.
1'' Id. at 84.
I2 Id. at 97 ("In all respects, the determination of what sentence best serves the pur-
poses of sentencing shall be based on the best available evidence, research, and data.").
H13 Id.
114 Redding, supra note 31, at 16 n.79.
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carrying out the sentence-modification authority." I" However, the revised
Code lays out "principles of legislation" to help guide states who wish to
adopt this approach:
§ 305.6 Modification of Long-Term Prison Sentences
[Principles for Legislation]
(1) An official decisionmaker in each jurisdiction shall be granted
authority to hear and rule upon applications for modification of sentence
from prisoners who have served 15 years of imprisonment under any
sentence of imprisonment as defined in § 6.10A.
(2) A prisoner's right to apply for sentence modification under this
provision should recur at intervals not to exceed a period of 10 years.
(3) An institution may be designated to screen prisoners' applications,
and decide which applications will go forward to the official
decisionmaker in paragraph 1, or make recommendations to that
decisionmaker concerning which applications should go forward.
(4) If the applicant prisoner is indigent, an adequate mechanism for the
discretionary appointment of counsel shall exist under this provision
(5) The legal standard for sentence modification under this provision
shall be prospective. The underlying inquiry shall be whether, in light
of current circumstances, the purposes of sentencing in §1.02(2) would
be best served by completion of the original sentence or a modified
sentence.
(6) The official decisionmaker shall be authorized to modify any aspect
of the original sentence, so long as the remainder of the modified
sentence is no more severe than the remainder of the original sentence.
The decisionmaker's authority under this provision shall not be limited
by any mandatory-minimum term of incarceration specified in statute
(7) An adequate record of proceedings under this provision shall be
maintained, and the official decisionmaker shall be required to make a
statement of reasons for its decisions on the record.
(8) There shall be a mechanism for discretionary review of decisions
under this provision by the courts.
(9) Adequate procedures shall be created to give notice to prisoners of
their rights under this provision.
The Institute concludes, "creation of a 'second look' sentence-
modification mechanism is imperative whenever a legal system deprives
offenders of their liberty for a substantial portion of their adult lives."" 6
This provision originally would have granted trial courts discretionary
authority to revisit extremely long sentences of imprisonment after the
prisoner has served at least fifteen years." 7 However, vesting such power
in trial courts was rejected because the provision provided "an unsound
basis for exclusive recommendation to every state.""" Thus, the provision
now gives states the discretion to choose the "official decisionmaker."
The comments following the provision outline various entities that could
serve as this decisionmaker. Examples include newly created agencies or
tribunals, parole boards, trial courts, sentencing commissions, Departments
of Corrections, and Boards of Pardons." 9 The Reporter acknowledges
115 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 305.6.
ii6 Id.
1l7 Id.
I8 Id.
f19 Id.
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that many states will be tempted to place existing parole boards in
charge of the sentence-modification process, but recommends that states
exercise caution in bestowing this responsibility because of parole boards'
susceptibility to political influences.'
Bestowing "second look" sentence modification responsibility on
parole boards should be a viable option considered by states adopting
the revised Code. First, the provision's requirement that courts retain the
power of discretionary review of decisions provides a procedural safeguard
that mitigates the potential for political influences. Judges certainly are
not immune to political pressure, but permitting review of sentence-
modification decisions will increase transparency in the process and may
expose unwarranted political influences. Second, if states reform board
membership requirements to adhere to evidence-based sentencing, the
more balanced makeup of the board membership would serve as its own
safeguard. Governors will be more inclined to appoint social scientists
or actuarial experts based on their level of expertise rather than political
cronyism, or else face public scrutiny.
III. WHO SHOULD SERVE ON PAROLE BOARDS?
A. Lawyers
Although former law enforcement officials and corrections officers
dominate membership on state parole boards, attorneys make up the next
closest demographic. Among the states that report information regarding
parole board membership, lawyers constitute anywhere from zero"' to
one hundred percent2 of parole board memberships. Many.states' boards
include a balance of attorneys and former law enforcement officials. For
instance, North Carolina's three-member parole commission has one
member with a Juris Doctorate degree,2 3 Ohio has three attorneys on its
eight-member board,2 4 and Massachusetts has four attorneys on its seven-
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., About PPP: South Carolina Board of Paroles and Pardons, ST. S.C., http://www.
dppps.sc.gov/stateboard.html (last visited Mar. 25, zoz); Commissioners, NEV. BD. PAROLE
COMM'Rs, http://parole.nv.gov/node/5 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); Delaware Board of Parole
Members, ST. DEL., http://boardofparole.delaware.gov/board.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012);
The Florida Parole Commission, My FLA., https:/fpc.state.fl.us/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012);
Welcomefrom the Director, A"A. BD. PARDONS & PAROLE, http://www.pardons.state.al.us/ALABPP/
Main/ALABPP%2oMAIN.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
122 The State of Utah Board of Pardons and Parole currently consists of five members
who have attained a Juris Doctorate. BoardMembers, ST. UTAH BD. PARDONS & PAROLE, http://
bop.utah.gov/board.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
123 The Parole Commissioners, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY, http://www.doc.state.nc.us/parole/
bios.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2o1).
124 Parole BoardMembers, OHIO.Gov, http:llwww.drc.ohio.govlweb/PBMembers.htm (last
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member board."' 5 State statutes generally do not establish a minimum
requirement for the number of attorneys on state parole boards.1
2 6
However, South Dakota requires that at least three attorneys serve on its
nine-member parole board (one appointed by the Governor, one by the
Attorney General, and one by the Supreme Court)." 7
Why does South Dakota recognize the importance of having attorneys
on the parole board process? There are a number of theories that suggest
that attorneys are excellent resources in processes such as parole. First,
in acting on matters relating to parole, the board is a deliberative body
and is deemed to be performing a judicial function.2 8 This "judicial
function" includes ensuring that board actions adhere to the constitutional
requirements of due process. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory
language in parole statutes can create a liberty interest that requires
minimal due process.'2 9 Notions of "due process" and "liberty interest"
are complicated and unlikely to be understood by laypeople. Moreover,
the determination that a statute contains mandatory language requires the
ability to closely analyze statutes, a skill developed in law schools across
the country.
Second, because parole board decisions are generally not subject to
judicial review,130 lawyers may provide the necessary balance to ensure
fair and unbiased decision-making. In most jurisdictions, inmates eligible
for parole are not permitted to have counsel during parole hearings.
Thus, attorneys may be indispensable to the practice of examining the
legal implications of decisions. In their brief on behalf of the petitioner
in Gideon v. Wainwright, the American an d Florida Civil Liberties Unions
opined, "[o]ur system of justice depends upon the active participation of
trained counsel on both sides-of persons who meet the rigid qualifications
necessary for admission to the bar. This is the essence of our adversary
system. Lawyers are not superfluous appendages in the criminal process."''
Lawyers provide valuable assistance in navigating "the labyrinth of the
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
125 Parole Board Members, MAss.Gov, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-board/
board-members.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
126 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-20 (LexisNexis 2011), ALASKA STAT. § 33. 16.020 (2o I o).
127 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-13-1 (2003).
128 67A C.J.S. Pardon &Parole § 46 (2002).
129 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1987) (finding that Montana's parole
statute that contained mandatory language created a protected liberty interest); Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. i, 12 (1979) (finding that the Nebraska pa-
role statute's use of mandatory language created a protected liberty interest); see also Palacios,
supra note 8, at 589.
130 See Johns, supra note 52, at 307.
131 Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, Gideon v.
Cochran, 371 U.S. 857 (1962) (No. 155), 1962 WL 115121.
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law"'32 which may be "too intricate for the layman to master" '133 because
"[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law.' ' 134
B. Social Scientists / Evidence-Based Sentencing
As discussed previously, most states favor law enforcement officials and
occasionally attorneys when appointing members to serve on state parole
boards. Few state parole boards are made up of social scientists in the fields
of sociology, psychology, or statistics. However, recent trends in the way
states and the ALI have begun thinking about sentencing decision making
suggest that a change in parole board membership should also include an
increase in appointments of social scientists. Over the last ten years, many
scholars have argued that sentencing decisions should be made by using
"evidence-based sentencing," which focuses on using scientific research
to improve the quality of decision making.'35 Although there is no uniform
definition of "evidence-based sentencing," it generally contains the
following common characteristics:
* An assessment of risk factors (that increase the
likelihood of recidivism);
* An assessment of protective factors (that decrease
the likelihood of recidivism);
* An assessment of criminogenic needs ('clinical
disorders or functional; impairments that, if ameliorated,
substantially reduce the likelihood that the offender will
recidivate');
* An estimate of recidivism risk (defined with
reference to particular types of recidivism, in particular
contexts, over a specified time period) through the use of
scientifically-validated risk assessment instruments and
methods;
* An identification of the most effective (i.e.,
recidivism preventing) sentencing options and
interventions (including correctional and treatment
programming) based on the particular offender's risk
factors, protective factors, and criminogenic needs.
136
132 Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443,446 (1962).
133 Id.
134 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
135 Redding, supra note 31, at 2.
136 Id. at 3-4 (quoting Douglas B. Marlowe, Evidence-BasedSnrencingfor Drug Offenders:
An Analysis of Prognostic Risks and Criminogenic Needs, I CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 181 (2009)).
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As recently as thirty years ago, the questions of how to prevent
recidivism and how to rehabilitate offenders were virtually impossible to
answer, leading at least one researcher to surmise that "nothing works."' 37
Certain experts also concluded that predicting "recidivism risk" was
extremely inaccurate, perhaps no more accurate than flipping a coin. 3'
Studies demonstrated that attempts to predict violent behavior had a ninety
percent error rate 39 and that "psychologists and psychiatrists are accurate
in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior."I4°
However, there is no longer a dearth of information regarding
identification of risk factors and protective factors,' nor a lack of scientific
techniques capable of reliably assessing that risk. 142 Our increased
expertise in understanding and analyzing these factors "has . . . led to
more sophisticated and scientifically-based rehabilitation programs with
proven effectiveness, along with an understanding of why some programs
do not work."'143 Evidence-based sentencing embraces the development
in the field and puts this scientific knowledge to use "in a systematic and
structured way, to guide sentencing."' 1 4 Many scholars believe evidence-
based sentencing will become more common as courts and legislatures
become more familiar with the methodology and results.
145
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases "appear to push federal and state
sentencing systems towards allowing greater judicial discretion,"'" which
may lead to an accelerated trend in evidence-based sentencing. 147 The
American Law Institute's new Model Penal Code sentencing provisions
137 See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, hE
PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 48-49.
138 See Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 71 I-I6 (1974).
139 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o, 920 n.2 (citing various studies and the amicus brief
of the American Psychological Association).
140 JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 (1981).
141 Redding, supra note 31, at 5; see also DONALD ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (4 th ed. 2006); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS 4-5 (1998)
(identifying risk and protective factors for serious juvenile crime).
142 Redding, supra note 3 1, at 5.
143 Id. at 5-6.
144 Id. at 6.
145 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
ISSUES I 12 (2002) (internal citations omitted) ("Violence risk assessment is likely to continue
to move strongly in an actuarial direction.").
146 Redding, supra note 31, at 6-7; see also Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of
Sentencing Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 377, 377-86, 4oo-o8 (2005) (reviewing recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases that have invalidated aspects of mandatory sentencing guidelines, and suggesting
that such decisions may allow for greater judicial discretion in sentencing and also provide the
opportunity to reform state sentencing systems).
147 Redding, supra note 301, at 6.
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reflect the trend toward evidence-based sentencing in an attempt to reduce
recidivism by "deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation." '48 Even prior
to the passage of the final version of the Model Penal Code, jurisdictions
across the country are beginning to adopt evidence-based sentencing
practices. 14 9 In fact, Oregon passed legislation in 2005 mandating that
seventy-five percent of its funding for correction programs be allocated to
evidence-based programs.5
As states begin to adopt this new Code, a parallel restructuring of parole
board membership to include members who can comprehend this evidence
and utilize it in the board's decision making is imperative. Despite the ALI's
movement toward determinate sentencing and away from discretionary
release decisions, the ALl has not suggested the dissolution of parole
boards. Instead, it acknowledges that parole boards may still serve a vital
function in both "second look" sentence modification and the supervision
of parolees. Consequently, states adopting the structure promoted by
the new MPC must simultaneously guarantee that their parole boards
are prepared to meet new requirements placed on them by the influx of
evidence-based sentencing.
It is precisely for these reasons that states should mandate that social
scientists, or even experts in applied mathematics, are present on state
parole boards because, as various scholars have argued, "decision makers in
the criminal justice system need to become well versed on the science and
practice of risk assessment."'' Psychiatrists, psychologists, statisticians,
sociologists and other social scientists often have extensive training
in statistics and understanding otherwise confusing data. Unlike most
attorneys or law enforcement officials, those with training in quantitative
statistical methodology are better equipped to analyze risk assessment data.
There are a number of reasons to advocate inclusion of social scientists
as board members (as opposed to training current members). First, "the
evidence-base used to develop risk assessment procedures is "inchoate"-
both incomplete and constantly changing."' 2 As advances in research and
theory occur, what is considered "good" evidence-based risk assessment
may be considered "bad" in the next year.'53 In order to provide training
to current parole board members (attorneys and law enforcement officials)
on evidence-based sentencing, a well-defined system would be necessary.
Those with training in statistics, however, are more likely to understand
148 Id.
149 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6B.09 (discussing eights states
that have instituted risk assessment procedures as a routine part of sentencing).
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 182.525 (2005).
151 Redding, supra note 31, at 13-14.
152 Stephen Hart, Evidence-Based Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence, I CHAP. J. CriM.
JUST. 143, 164 (2009).
153 Id.
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the need to adapt their approach as research advances. Given the difficulty
of training law enforcement officials and attorneys on how to understand
this new evidence-based system in the first place, it would be a drain
on time and resources to continually "re-train" them each time a new
advance is made. Social scientists may also need similar re-training, similar
to Continuing Legal Education for attorneys, but their education and
statistical acumen should mitigate a resource drain from training.
Second, "although a risk assessment procedure may be characterized
generally as evidence-based (to some greater or lesser degree), the risk
assessment of a given offender is not.'"' 4 That is to say, it is impossible to
measure the specific probability that a particular offender will recidivate. A
balance of social scientists, law enforcement officials, and attorneys will be
able to utilize each of their areas of expertise in making a well-informed
decision regarding release (or "second look" sentence modifications). The
law enforcement official can use her long history in behavioral evaluation;
the attorney can be the gatekeeper of deliberation and guarantor of
constitutional rights; social scientists can ensure that the recommendations
comport with what is statistically preferable.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION: TWEAKING THE "SOUTH DAKOTA APPROACH"
As states continue to move toward embracing evidence-based
sentencing, they must simultaneously address the parallel changes needed
in their parole board membership. Despite the criticism of parole boards
and the movement toward determinate sentencing with extremely limited
discretionary release authority, state parole boards continue to serve a vital
role in the criminal justice system. However, failure of states to modernize
their parole board membership while they simultaneously modernize
parole practices would be a substantial waste of effort and resources. As
this Note argues, striking a balance between the backgrounds of parole
board members is a tremendous first step that will lead to more effective
decision making. The inclusion of social scientists in the makeup of parole
boards serves as the final step in effectuating evidence-based sentencing.
Fortunately, the paradigm shift in thinking about sentencing does not
require a fundamental overhaul of the statutory schemes most states have
in place. South Dakota's parole board statute should serve as a guidepost
for those states that wish to adhere to this balanced approach to parole
board membership. South Dakota requires that at least three attorneys
serve on its Board of Pardon and Paroles, s15 with one appointed by the
Governor, one appointed by the Attorney General, and one appointed by
the Supreme Court, all approved with the advice and consent of the South
154 Id.
155 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-13-I (201i).
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Dakota Senate.156 Therefore, attorneys comprise at least one-third of the
nine-member Board. Moreover, the appointment decisions are not left to
the whims of the Governor.
States who adopt the new Model Penal Code sentencing provisions
or independently enact evidence-based sentencing should include
similar language in their statutes requiring inclusion of social scientists,
applied mathematicians, or other candidates with a strong background in
the actuarial sciences. Similarly, state statutes may require that the other
members consist of law enforcement officials, victims of crimes, or ordinary
citizens. Codification of such suggestions reflects the need for a balanced
decision-making body while also respecting the long-standing traditions
of state parole board membership.
As states enact evidence-based sentencing, they must also make
serious endeavors to educate judges, prosecutors, probation officers,
and attorneys about the new empirically based sentencing guidelines.
Recognizing Professor Stephen D. Hart's "clarion call for probation
officers, prosecutors, and judges to become knowledgeable about risk/
needs assessment,"'5 Professor Richard E. Redding maintains that "[r]isk
assessment is invaluable when used appropriately and in conjunction with
other information, which necessitates an understanding of the limitations of
risk assessment instruments and how to interpret and use the information
they provide."'58 This education will require additional funding, but the
cost can be mitigated by the inclusion of social scientists in deliberative
bodies, such as parole boards, which can provide oversight to ensure that the
empirical data is being appropriately considered by other board members.
CONCLUSION
Reforming parole board membership is one of the many ways in which
states must begin to address some of the inadequacies of their criminal
justice system. With the emergence and gradual acceptance of policies
such as evidence-based sentencing, aimed at modernizing an often-
anachronistic system, states must not neglect to make changes wherever
necessary. This Note demonstrates the importance of addressing parole
board membership as states begin to reform their sentencing provisions
and guidelines. Most scholarship on evidence-based sentencing currently
focuses on either touting or questioning the merits of empirically based
decision-making. Some academics also address the implementation of
these policies as states adopt the approach. Often, however, parole boards
are left out of this academic discourse. Failure to address parole boards in
156 Id.
157 Redding, supra note 3 1, at 16.
158 Id.
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light of evidence-based sentencing reform can be likened to constructing
an environmentally friendly house with solar panels that still uses inefficient
incandescent light bulbs. It would be anathema to common sense to engage
in a paradigm restructuring of the sentencing system without addressing
corollary changes needed to the makeup of state parole boards, which
comprise a vital component of the criminal justice system.

